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We consider jointly replenishing n ex-ante identical ﬁrms that operate under an EOQ like setting using a
non-cooperative game under asymmetric information. In this game, each ﬁrm, upon being privately
informed about its demand rate (or inventory cost rate), submits a private contribution to an intermedi-
ary that speciﬁes how much it is willing to pay for its replenishment per unit of time and the interme-
diary determines the maximum feasible frequency for the joint orders that would ﬁnance the ﬁxed
replenishment cost. We show that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists and characterize the equilibrium
in this game. We also show that the contributions are monotone increasing in each ﬁrm’s type. We ﬁnally
conduct a numerical study to compare the equilibrium to solutions obtained under independent and
cooperative ordering, and under full information. The results show that while information asymmetry
eliminates free-riding in the contributions game, the resulting aggregate contributions are not as high
as under full information, leading to higher aggregate costs.
 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
A fundamental trade-off in operations is between cycle stocks
and setup costs associated with production, transportation or pro-
curement. Mathematical models examining this trade-off have
been developed since 1913 starting with the classical Economic Or-
der Quantity (EOQ) model (Harris, 1913). In the EOQ model, a ﬁrm
faces a constant and deterministic demand rate, pays a ﬁxed setup
cost for each replenishment order and incurs a holding cost for
each unit of inventory it keeps per unit of time. The problem is
to ﬁnd the order quantity that the ﬁrm should use in each replen-
ishment so that its setup costs and inventory holding costs are
minimized. Since then, there has been a vast amount of literature
on lot sizing that relaxes certain restrictive assumptions of the
EOQ model. The interested reader is referred to Jans and Degraeve
(2008) for a recent review of research in this area.
A major cost saving opportunity in this setting is joint replen-
ishment, i.e., consolidating orders for different items (or locations).
By carefully coordinating the replenishment of multiple items, one
can exploit the economies of scale of ordering jointly and reduce
setup costs, cycle inventories or both. Finding a joint replenish-
ment policy to minimize aggregate costs is known as the joint
replenishment problem in the literature. There is also large body
of research in this area: see Khouja and Goyal (2008) for a recent
review.ll rights reserved.
: +90 312 2664054.Although joint replenishment may be a signiﬁcant means to re-
duce costs, when it involves a group of items or locations that are
not controlled centrally, it is not always apparent how to split
these savings among the parties fairly. A fair allocation is necessary
to induce different decentralized entities to engage in cooperation.
Recently, cooperative game theory models are developed to inves-
tigate whether a fair allocation of total savings (or total costs) is
possible and if so, how. In the ﬁrst of these models, Meca et al.
(2004) show that it is possible to coordinate the system (obtain
minimum total cost) when the players only share their order fre-
quencies prior to joint replenishment. They propose an allocation
mechanism which distributes the total setup cost among the
jointly replenished locations in proportion to the square of their or-
der frequencies and show that this allocation is in the core of the
game, i.e., the ﬁrms cannot decrease their costs further by defect-
ing from the grand coalition of ﬁrms. In Meca et al. (2004), there
are only major setup costs, i.e., setup costs are independent of
which items are included in the order. When there are also minor
setup costs associated with each item, it is not always optimal to
order every item with every replenishment. In fact, the structure
of the policy that minimizes the total costs is not known. For this
problem, Hartman and Dror (2007) show that the game with a spe-
ciﬁc group of items has a core, whenever these items need to be or-
dered together on the same schedule to minimize total costs. For
the same problem, Dror et al. (2012) investigate how sensitive
the stability of coordinated ordering (or the existence of a core)
is to the changes in the cost parameters and conduct a computa-
tional study to show that a core allocation can be obtained without
excessive computation. In particular, the Lauderback allocation
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stand-alone cost and marginal cost) is in the core for 98.8% of the
games they study. Elomri et al. (2012) consider the problem of
coalition formation when the joint replenishment game is not
superadditive and propose an exact fractional programming based
solution to ﬁnd the efﬁcient coalitions. Anily and Haviv (2007) lim-
it their attention to the near optimal power-of-two policies for this
problem, and show the existence and example of a core allocation
of total costs. These results are extended to the case of more
general setup cost structures in Zhang (2009). In a related paper,
Viswanathan and Piplani (2001) study a problem of a vendor which
coordinates the replenishment of multiple retailers by requiring
them to order at multiples of a common replenishment period
and offering a price discount to entice the retailers to accept this
strategy. Minner (2007) uses bargaining models to study the
collaboration between two ﬁrms that have a common interest to
jointly replenish material requirements. Van den Heuvel et al.
(2007) consider a problem in which multiple retailers have to
satisfy their periodic, non-stationary and known demand over a
ﬁnite horizon. The authors study the cooperative game that arises
from cost savings obtained by jointly replenishing the retailers.
Recent reviews of cooperative games for joint replenishment and
other inventory problems can be seen in Nagarajan and Sos˘ic´
(2008) and Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2011).
While cooperative analysis of joint replenishment problems
received a reasonable amount of attention in the literature, there
is limited research that use non-cooperative game theory to study
such problems. In fact, Bauso et al. (2008), Meca et al. (2003) and
Körpeog˘lu et al. (2012) are the only three papers that adopt a
non-cooperative approach. Bauso et al. (2008) study a ﬁnite hori-
zon, periodic problem in which multiple ﬁrms need to determine
their order quantities in each period to satisfy their demand. The
replenishment order cost is shared among multiple ﬁrms that
order in the same period. It is shown that this game admits a set
of pure-strategy Nash equilibria, one of which is Pareto optimal.
The authors propose a consensus protocol with which ﬁrms
converge to one of the Nash equilibria, but not necessarily a Pareto
optimal one.
Meca et al. (2003) study a non-cooperative reporting game
where stand-alone order frequencies of the ﬁrms are common
knowledge but not veriﬁable. Each ﬁrm reports an order frequency
(that may be different from its true order frequency) and the joint
order frequency is determined to minimize the total joint costs
based on these reports. Each ﬁrm incurs holding cost individually
and pays a share of the joint replenishment cost in proportion to
the squares of reported order frequencies. It is shown that while
this rule leads to core allocations under cooperative formulations,
it results in signiﬁcant misreporting and inefﬁciency in a non-
cooperative framework.
Körpeog˘lu et al. (2012) use a more direct approach. They con-
sider n ﬁrms with arbitrary demand and inventory holding cost
rates. These are assumed to be common knowledge. There is a
ﬁxed replenishment cost which can be incurred individually by
each ﬁrm or incurred jointly among ﬁrms that would participate
in joint replenishment. Each ﬁrm decides whether to participate
in joint replenishment or to replenish independently and each
participating ﬁrm reports the level of his contribution to an inter-
mediary. The intermediary then selects the smallest joint cycle
time that can be ﬁnanced with these contributions. Körpeog˘lu
et al. (2012) ﬁnd that in any equilibrium of the game, the ﬁrms
with the lowest stand-alone cycle time share the replenishment
cost and the others pay only the minimum contribution.
An important assumption used in all papers that study non-
cooperative joint replenishment games is that all relevant informa-
tion is common knowledge. However, as in many other contexts,
information asymmetries exist in many practical supply chainsettings due to lack of communication or incentives for hiding
information. It is often crucial to model these asymmetries in order
to better understand the strategic behavior among competing
ﬁrms or design mechanisms that would lead to more favorable
outcomes for them. Recently, we have seen studies in supply chain
management literature that model information asymmetries.
Important examples include Corbett (2001) and Burnetas et al.
(2007).
Previous research on the joint replenishment problem high-
lights the importance of modeling private information in this
particular setting. As mentioned above, in the equilibrium found
in Körpeog˘lu et al. (2012), ﬁrms with the lowest stand-alone cycle
time pay for all of the replenishment cost except the minimum
contributions that will be paid by the rest of the ﬁrms. Thus, if a
ﬁrm knows that there is another ﬁrm with a lower stand-alone
cycle time (or higher adjusted demand rate which is equal to
inventory holding cost rate multiplied by the demand rate), it
tends to ride free and pays the minimum contribution. In an
asymmetric information game, however, we should get larger con-
tributions from the ﬁrms with higher stand-alone cycle times,
since the other ﬁrms’ information is not available to them. Conse-
quently, an important question is whether removing the possibility
of free-riding through introducing information asymmetry would
lead to a more efﬁcient mechanism in terms of aggregate costs
incurred by all ﬁrms.
In this paper, we consider the problem of jointly replenishing n
ﬁrms that operate under an EOQ like setting using a non-coopera-
tive game in which ﬁrms are privately informed about their param-
eters (demand rates and/or inventory holding cost rates). The game
we model is an asymmetric information counterpart of the game
suggested in Körpeog˘lu et al. (2012). Each ﬁrm, upon being
privately informed about its parameters, submits a private contri-
bution to an intermediary that speciﬁes how much it is willing to
contribute to replenishment costs per unit of time. The intermedi-
ary then determines the frequency for the joint orders that would
ﬁnance the setup cost. Since each ﬁrm’s inventory holding cost
depends on the joint frequency which in turn depends on contribu-
tions from all ﬁrms, this is non-cooperative game in which each
ﬁrm’s strategy is its contribution. Our solution concept for this
game is Bayesian Nash equilibrium. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium
is a Nash equilibrium where each player, given its type (parame-
ter), selects a best response against the average best responses of
the competing players. We prove that a pure-strategy Bayesian
Nash equilibrium exists and show that the equilibria can be char-
acterized by a system of integral equations. We also conduct a
numerical study to analyze the impact of competition and informa-
tion asymmetry on equilibrium behavior and outcomes by com-
paring the equilibrium we obtain to centralized and independent
ordering and to a non-cooperative game under full information.
The results show that joint replenishment continues to lead to sig-
niﬁcant improvements over independent ordering, despite the fact
that ﬁrms compete under information asymmetry. The results also
show that while information asymmetry eliminates free-riding in the
game, the full information game leads to more efﬁcient outcomes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
provide our model and results for the asymmetric information
game. In Section 3, we provide the results of our numerical study
and the managerial insights derived from this study. Section 4 con-
cludes the paper along with avenues for future research.2. Model
We consider a stylized EOQ environment with a set of ﬁrms
N = {1, . . . ,n}(jNj = n). Each ﬁrm j is facing a constant deterministic
demand with rate bj per unit of time. Inventory holding cost rate
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regardless of order size and we assume minor ordering costs are
zero. We deﬁne aj = cjbj, which will be convenient in all the settings
that we consider below.We will refer to aj as adjusted demand rate
for ﬁrm j. We assume that each ﬁrm’s adjusted demand rate is its
private information. We also assume that aj’s are independent
draws from a common continuous prior distribution F with sup-
port A ¼ ½a; awith 0 < a < a < þ1. Note that this captures having
uncertainty on demand rate or inventory holding cost rate (given
that the other is same across ﬁrms) or on both demand rate and
inventory holding cost rate.
In the game we propose, ﬁrst, each ﬁrm learns its adjusted de-
mand rate (type). Then, ﬁrms submit their private contributions
that specify their payment rate for the replenishment service.
Based on these contributions, the intermediary then determines
the minimum cycle length of the joint replenishment such that
would ﬁnance the ﬁxed cost j. Finally, ﬁrms incur their costs
according to this cycle length. Since ﬁrms do not reveal their type
during the game, we have an asymmetric information game in
which each ﬁrm’s strategy is its contribution, which is a function
of its adjusted demand rate.
Let rj: A?H be the contribution function where H ¼ ½0;r and
rj(aj) is the contribution that ﬁrm j makes if its type is aj. We
assume an upper bound r ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2ja
p
on the action space since a
contribution higher than this value leads to a total cost higher than
the stand-alone total cost regardless of the adjusted demand
rate realizations. Moreover, we exclude negative contributions.
Then, for a given a = (a1, . . . ,an) the intermediary will set the cycle
length to
tðaÞ ¼ jP
k2NrkðakÞ
: ð1Þ
Consider a ﬁrm j with type aj. Denote rj(aj) as the vector of
contributions of the ﬁrms except that of ﬁrm j under realization
aj = (a1, . . . ,aj1,aj, . . . ,an). The payoff for ﬁrm j under this realiza-
tion can be written as
/jðrj; rj;aj;ajÞ ¼
1
2
ajtðaj;ajÞ þ rj; ð2Þ
and the expected payoff for this ﬁrm is
Ujðrj; rj;ajÞ ¼
Z
An1
/ðrj; rj;aj;ajÞf n1ðajÞdaj
¼ 1
2
jaj
Z
An1
1
rj þ
P
k2N;k–jrkðakÞ
f n1ðajÞdaj þ rj ð3Þ
where An1 is the (n  1)st Cartesian power of the interval A and
f n1ðajÞ ¼
Q
k2N;k–jf ðakÞ.
Firm j’s best response as a function of its type aj and other ﬁrms’
contributions rj is denoted by q and is given by
qðrj;ajÞ ¼ argmin
rj
Ujðrj; rj;ajÞ subject to rj P 0: ð4Þ
The ﬁrst and second derivative of the payoff function (3) are
given as follows
@Ujðrj; rj;ajÞ
@rj
¼ 1
2
jaj
Z
An1
1
rj þ
P
k2N;k–jrkðakÞ
 2 f n1ðajÞdaj þ 1; ð5Þ
@2Ujðrj; rj;ajÞ
@r2j
¼ jaj
Z
An1
1
rj þ
P
k2N;k–jrkðakÞ
 3 f n1ðajÞdaj: ð6Þ
Since contributions are non-negative, the integrand in (6) is a
non-negative function leading to the convexity of the payoff
function in rj. Therefore, the problem (4) is a convex optimization
problem with a single constraint. The problem has a cornersolution and ﬁrm j’s best response is to contribute zero if the ﬁrst
derivative of the objective function given in (5) is non-negative at
rj = 0 and an interior solution (characterized by the ﬁrst order con-
dition), otherwise. Therefore, the best response function can be ex-
pressed as follows:
qjðrj;ajÞ ¼
0; if
R
An1
1P
k2N;k–j rkðakÞ
 2 f n1ðajÞdaj 6 2jaj ;
q^ðrj;ajÞ; otherwise;
8><
>: ð7Þ
where q^ðrj;ajÞ is the solution toZ
An1
1
ðq^ðrj;ajÞ þ
P
k2N;k–jrkðakÞÞ2
f n1ðajÞdaj ¼ 2jaj :
The characterization in (7) states that a ﬁrm j with type aj will
choose to ride free (rj = 0) if the second moment of the joint cycle
time among the other n  1 ﬁrms is smaller than the square of
stand-alone cycle time for ﬁrm j. Alternatively, (7) states that given
the contribution strategies of others, there will be a threshold value
for ﬁrm j’s adjusted demand rate below which the ﬁrm will contrib-
ute zero. This threshold is given by
a^ðrjÞ ¼ 2j RAn1 1P
k2N;k–jrkðakÞ
 2 f n1ðajÞdaj : ð8Þ
Convexity of the objective function also ensures that each ﬁrm has a
unique best response to other ﬁrms’ contributions given its type.
We next show that each ﬁrm’s best response function is
increasing in its type (all proofs are provided in Appendix).
Lemma 1. Each ﬁrm j’s best response to other ﬁrms’ contributions is
increasing in its type aj.
A pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a set of functions
r ¼ r1; r2; . . . ; rn
 
such that qj rj;aj
 
¼ rj ðajÞ for all aj and for all
j 2 N. We establish the existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash
equilibrium in the next theorem.
Theorem 1. A pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists for the
joint replenishment game under asymmetric information.
In order to characterize the Bayesian Nash equilibria, we need
the following lemma which states that there is at least one ﬁrm
which contributes a positive amount regardless of its type.
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium, there exists at least one ﬁrm j such that
rj ðajÞ > 0; forall aj 2 A:
Using Lemma 2, we can provide a simple characterization of the
Bayesian Nash equilibria in the following theorem.Theorem 2. Any collection of functions r1ða1Þ; r2ða2Þ; . . . ; rnðanÞ
 
that satisfy (9) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.Z
An1
1
ðr1ða1Þ þ r2ða2Þ þ . . .þ rnðanÞÞ2
f n1ðajÞdaj
¼ 2
jaj
; for all j 2 N: ð9Þ
Theorem 2 states that ﬁnding an equilibrium requires solving n
integral equations simultaneously. Obtaining a closed form solu-
tion for the system (9) is not possible. However, we can provide
the following properties for the equilibrium contribution functions.
First, if we multiply both sides of (9) by j2 f(aj) and integrate
both sides over the interval A, we get
E
j
ðr1ða1Þ þ r2ða2Þ þ    þ rnðanÞÞ
 2" #
¼ E 2j
aj
	 

:
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of the equilibrium cycle length. The right hand side, on the other
hand is the second moment of the stand-alone cycle length. This
shows that second moment of cycle length is ‘‘invariant’’ – it is pre-
served when one moves from stand-alone (independent) replenish-
ment to non-cooperative joint replenishment.
In addition, using the monotonicity of the best-response func-
tions provided in Lemma 1, we can also say the following regarding
the equilibrium contribution functions.
Corollary 1. In all equilibria, the contribution function for each ﬁrm is
monotone increasing in its type.
The characterization in (9) of Theorem 2 allows multiple equi-
libria with different contribution functions for each player. How-
ever, if we restrict ourselves to symmetric equilibria, we have
the following result.
Corollary 2. The symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium satisﬁes the
following
Z
An1
1
rðajÞ þ
P
k2N;k–jrðakÞ
 2 f n1ðajÞdaj ¼ 2jaj for all aj:
ð10Þ
Now consider the symmetric equilibrium r⁄. For a given realiza-
tion a = (a1, . . . ,an), the cycle length that is set by the intermediary
is given as
TaðaÞ ¼ jP
k2NrðakÞ
:
This leads to an aggregate total cost expression as follows
CaðaÞ ¼ 1
2
j
P
k2NakP
k2NrðakÞ
þ
X
k2N
rðakÞ:
Therefore expected replenishment cost, and expected aggregate
total cost rate can be written as
E½Ra ¼ n
Z
A
rðaÞf ðaÞda;
E½Ca ¼ 1
2
j
Z
An
P
k2NakP
k2NrðakÞ
f nðaÞdaþ E½Ra:2.1. Possible extensions
It is important to note the implications of relaxing certain
assumptions on our model and results. First, we assume that the
adjusted demand rates are independent draws from the same dis-
tribution. In general, each player’s adjusted demand rate may be
drawn from a different distribution. Furthermore, each player’s ad-
justed demand rate estimate for another player may be different.
Let, Fjk be the distribution of player j’s estimate of player k with a
support Ajk. One can verify that the existence result provided in
Theorem 1 still holds for this case. One can also show that the equi-
librium can now be characterized asZ
Aj
1
r1ða1Þ þ r2ða2Þ þ    þ rnðanÞ
 2 fjðajÞdaj ¼ 2jaj ;
for all j 2 N;
where Aj ¼Qk2N;k–jAjk; f jk ¼ dFjk and fjðajÞ ¼Qk2N;k–jf jkðakÞ. While
this extension does not create any theoretical difﬁculties, comput-
ing the equilibrium will be challenging as one needs to solve a sys-
tem of n integral equations. In our numerical analysis in Section 3,
we assume a common distribution which allows us to focus on thesymmetric equilibrium that requires solving only one integral
equation.
Second, we assume that the setup cost j is known with cer-
tainty by all parties. Having an uncertainty or information asym-
metry on j will require a ﬁrm to take this into account when
minimizing its expected payoff in (3). We also assume that each
ﬁrm knows its own adjusted demand rate prior to submitting its
contribution. In a more general model, a ﬁrmmay have uncertainty
regarding its own demand rate as well (although the uncertainty it
faces will be obviously smaller than what the other ﬁrms are ex-
posed to regarding its adjusted demand rate). Again this uncer-
tainty has to be considered in the objective function of the ﬁrm
in (3). While our existence result should hold in these cases, we
leave these extensions to a future study.
Finally, we assume that working with an intermediary does not
lead to any coordination costs such as cost of exchanging informa-
tion and incorporating that information to the joint decisions, as
well as costs incurred by the ﬁrm due to delays (Clemons et al.,
1993). In the absence of these costs and minor setup costs, ﬁrms
will prefer participating to joint replenishment over independent
ordering, and therefore we do not model opting out from joint
replenishment in this study (please see Körpeog˘lu et al. (2012)
for such a game). Once the contributions game is played, the max-
imum coordination cost that each player is willing to pay will be
the difference between a ﬁrm’s cost in joint replenishment equilib-
rium and its stand-alone cost. In other cases, we need a formal
game in which these costs are represented as a part of each player’s
payoff (especially when the coordination cost is a function of the
number of participants in joint replenishment). We also leave this
important extension to a future study.
2.2. Benchmark models
We now brieﬂy review the three benchmark models used for
comparison: independent (decentralized) replenishment, joint
(centralized) replenishment and competitive replenishment under
full information.
INDEPENDENT (DECENTRALIZED) REPLENISHMENT
When the replenishment of the items is controlled by ﬁrms
operating independently, ﬁrm j’s total cost rate (Cj) is the sum of
its replenishment cost rate (Rj) and holding cost rate (Hj) and can
be written as a function of the cycle time t as follows
CjðtÞ ¼ RjðtÞ þ HjðtÞ ¼ jt þ
t
2
aj: ð11Þ
We assume that each ﬁrm learns its adjusted demand rate (type)
prior to determining its cycle length. Therefore, the function in
(11) can be minimized with the realized value of aj. This leads to
ﬁrm j’s optimal cycle time Tdj ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2j=aj
p
. Resulting replenishment
cost rate is Rdj ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
jaj=2
p
. Holding cost rate for ﬁrm j is also
Hdj ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
jaj=2
p
. Thus ﬁrm j’s total cost per unit of time is
Cdj ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2jaj
p
. The aggregate total cost rates for n ﬁrms under indepen-
dent replenishment are Cd ¼Pk2N ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2jakp , and Rd ¼ Hd ¼P
k2N
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
jak=2
p
.
JOINT (CENTRALIZED) REPLENISHMENT
In joint replenishment, replenishment decisions are taken cen-
trally to minimize the aggregate total cost. When there are no min-
or setup costs (setup costs speciﬁc to each ﬁrm), all ﬁrms will be
replenished in each cycle leading to a common cycle time (see
Meca et al. (2004) for a proof). The aggregate cost for n ﬁrms as a
function of the common cycle time t can be written as
CcðtÞ ¼ RcðtÞ þ HcðtÞ ¼ j
t
þ t
2
X
k2N
ak: ð12Þ
Once again, we assume that the values of ak are known before the
joint cycle time decision is taken. Therefore, the optimal cycle time
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optimal cost rates are Cc ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2jPk2Nakp , and Rc = Hc = Cc/2.
COMPETITIVE REPLENISHMENT UNDER FULL INFORMATION
Under full information, ﬁrms reveal their adjusted demand
rates (types) prior to submitting their private contributions. There-
fore, each ﬁrm uses its type information, as well as others’ when
deciding its contribution. The resulting game is simply the one-
stage game described in Körpeog˘lu et al. (2012) with minimum
contribution d = 0. Let a1,a2, . . . ,an be the types of the ﬁrms
1, . . . ,n. Let (n) be the ﬁrm with the highest adjusted demand rate,
i.e., a(n) = maxj2Naj. Also let L = {j 2 Njaj = a(n)}. Körpeog˘lu et al.
(2012) show that the equilibrium contributions satisfy the follow-
ing properties:
rk ¼ 0; 8k 2 N n L; and
X
k2L
rk ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
jaðnÞ=2
q
: ð13Þ
That is, ﬁrms whose adjusted demand rates are lower than the high-
est adjusted demand rate do not contribute for the joint replenish-
ment and ride free. Firms with the highest adjusted demand rate, on
the other hand, contribute a total of
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
jaðnÞ=2
p
. The equilibrium is
unique if there is only one ﬁrm with the highest adjusted demand
rate (L is a singleton), otherwise there are multiple equilibria. How-
ever, in all equilibria, aggregate contributions, aggregate costs and
the joint cycle time are unique. Joint cycle time is Tf ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2j=aðnÞp
Aggregate replenishment cost is Rf ¼Pk2Nrk ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃjaðnÞ=2p and aggre-
gate total cost is Cf ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃj=2aðnÞp aðnÞ þPk2Nak .
The above characterization states that the equilibrium is deter-
mined only by the largest adjusted demand rate. Since adjusted de-
mand rates are independent and identically distributed random
variables, this corresponds to the largest order statistic. Using this
fact, we can obtain the following expressions for the expected
aggregate replenishment cost, and expected aggregate total cost:
E½Rf  ¼ n
Z
A
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ja
2
r
f ðaÞ½FðaÞn1 da; ð14Þ
E½Cf  ¼ n!
Z a
a
Z an
a
  
Z a2
a
X
k2N
ak
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
j=2an
p
f nðaÞdaþ E½Rf : ð15Þ
The expression in (14) is due to the fact that largest order statistic
a(n) has a probability density function equal to n f(a)[F(a)]n1. The
expression in (15) is due to the fact that a(1), a(2), . . . , a(n) have a
joint density n!fn(a).3. Numerical study
We conduct a computational study to understand the impact of
competition and information asymmetry on equilibrium behavior
and total costs. In doing this, we compare the asymmetric informa-
tion game to centralized replenishment, independent replenish-
ment and competitive replenishment under full information. To
set up the experiment, the only two variables we need are the
replenishment ﬁxed cost j and the probability distribution of ad-
justed demand rates aj. The choice of the ﬁxed cost j is immaterial
as it appears only as a multiple in cost expressions and cancels out
in comparisons. We use a modiﬁed PERT distribution (Vose, 2008)
to model the uncertainty in adjusted demand rates. The modiﬁed
PERT distribution is a 4-parameter distribution and is frequently
used to model expert data. Expert opinion is used to specify the
minimum (a), maximum (b), most-likely (m) values and a fourth
parameter (k) controls the shape. The modiﬁed PERT distribution
is given as follows:
f ðxÞ ¼ ðx aÞ
g11ðb xÞg21
Bðg1;g2Þðb aÞg1þg21
;where B(g1,g2) is the beta function, and
g1 ¼ 1þ k
m a
b a
 
; g2 ¼ 1þ k
bm
b a
 
:
The mean (l) and variance (r2) are
l ¼ aþ kmþ b
kþ 2 ; r
2 ¼ ðl aÞðb lÞ
kþ 3 :
We pick the modiﬁed PERT distribution since it is deﬁned over a ﬁ-
nite interval and we can easily control the skewness and mode with
two dedicated parameters. In order to demonstrate the ﬂexibility of
the modiﬁed PERT distribution, we plot the density for various val-
ues ofm and k for (a,b) = (1,5) in Fig. 1. Observe that when k = 0, the
distribution reduces to uniform distribution.
We start our computational study with understanding the equi-
librium behavior in the non-cooperative asymmetric information
game. For this purpose, we assume that the adjusted demand rates
are independently and identically distributed with modiﬁed PERT
distribution with parameters a = 1, b = 5 and various values of k
and m. The ﬁxed cost j is equal to 10. We consider only the sym-
metric equilibrium. In order to compute the equilibrium given in
Eq. (10) numerically, we discretize the distribution of a at forty
equally spaced points in the interval (a,b).
Fig. 2 shows the contribution of a single ﬁrm as a function of its
adjusted demand rate when there are 1, 2, 3, or 4 ﬁrms with the 1-
ﬁrm case corresponding to independent ordering. First, note that
the contributions are ordered in the number of ﬁrms that partici-
pate in joint replenishment. Firms reduce their contributions as
there are more ﬁrms in joint replenishment. As expected, the
reduction is more signiﬁcant when there are fewer ﬁrms. Second,
as shown in Corollary 1, in equilibrium, a ﬁrm’s contribution in-
creases as its adjusted demand rate increases regardless of the
number of ﬁrms participating in joint replenishment. One can also
see that as the distribution shifts to the right (The most-likely va-
lue goes from 2 to 4), contributions for joint replenishments de-
crease, since the ﬁrm anticipates that other ﬁrms will have larger
adjusted demand rates and contribute less. In some cases, a ﬁrm
with a low adjusted demand rate may choose to contribute close
to zero (but not zero), especially when there are more ﬁrms in joint
replenishment (the bottom two plots when m = 3 and m = 4).
Fig. 3 shows the impact of asymmetric information on equilib-
rium under the same settings when there are two ﬁrms. The solid
lines in Fig. 3 represent the expected contribution by a ﬁrm as a
function of its own adjusted demand rate, given that it knows
the adjusted demand rates of other ﬁrms in the joint replenish-
ment program (full information). The dotted lines show the equi-
librium contributions under asymmetric information. For lower
values of adjusted demand rate, a ﬁrm that is not informed about
its rivals’ adjusted demand rates contributes more than what it
would contribute on the average under full information. However,
the full information contribution surpasses asymmetric informa-
tion for higher levels of adjusted demand rate. As the distribution
shifts to the right, contributions under both games decrease. How-
ever, contributions under full information are affected more, leading
to a larger region over which asymmetric information contributions
are larger than expected full information contributions.
Fig. 4 shows the impact of asymmetric information on equilib-
rium for three ﬁrms. Having three ﬁrms instead of two reduces
contributions in both games. The shape of the contribution func-
tion for the asymmetric information game, however, does not
change signiﬁcantly. On the other hand, expected full information
contributions are ﬂatter when the adjusted demand rate is low.
Overall, contributions decrease more in the asymmetric informa-
tion game as the number of ﬁrms increase from two to three. This
leads to a larger region over which full information contributions
are larger.
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Fig. 1. The density function of modiﬁed PERT distribution (a = 1,b = 5).
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Fig. 2. Equilibrium contribution as a function of adjusted demand rate with 1, 2, 3 and 4 ﬁrms under asymmetric information (a = 1,b = 5).
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information asymmetry on cycle times, aggregate contributions
and aggregate total costs, we carried out a more detailed study
in Table 1. We use a = 1 and consider two different values for b:
5 and 9. For b = 5, the most-likely value m takes on three values
2, 3 and 4. For b = 9, we consider the values 3, 5, and 7 for m.
The shape parameter k takes on three different values 0, 1, and 4.
We consider cases with 2, 3, and 4 players. In order to provide a
benchmark, we also show the results for cooperative joint replen-
ishment and independent ordering. Since cooperative joint replen-
ishment leads to lowest aggregate total costs, we use its expected
aggregate total costs in (Column 8) as our baseline. Columns 9, 10,
and 11 show the percentage deviation from the base case, of inde-
pendent ordering, non-cooperative joint replenishment under
asymmetric information and non-cooperative joint replenishment
under full information, respectively. In these columns, we provide
a policy’s ex-ante performance against centralized ordering, i.e., if
Cy is the expected cost under policy y, we report
DCy ¼ 100 E½Cy E½Cc 
E½Cc  , where C
c is expected cost under centralized
ordering. In the last column of Table 1, we report the percentage
gap between aggregate total costs of full and asymmetric informa-
tion games given by DCaf ¼ 100 ðE½Ca  E½Cf Þ=E½Cf .We ﬁrst note that the performance of independent ordering is
not very sensitive to the distribution parameters for a given n.
The aggregate total costs under independent ordering are, on the
average, 40.22%, 71.26%, and 97.49% higher than centralized order-
ing for n = 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Note that this performance is
very close to 100 ﬃﬃﬃnp  1  which is equal to the percentage in-
crease in aggregate total costs as one moves from centralized
ordering to decentralized ordering when the ﬁrms are identical
and their adjusted demands are deterministic (one can show this
by observing that Cc ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2nja
p
and Cd ¼ n
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2ja
p
if aj is known
and ﬁxed at a for all j 2 N).
Contributions under full information lead to signiﬁcantly more
efﬁcient outcomes. The aggregate total costs, on the average, are
only 3.61%, 9.40%, and 15.53% higher than centralized ordering
for n = 2, 3, and 4, respectively. In the full information game, the
efﬁciency is more sensitive to probability distribution of the ad-
justed demand rate. Note that the variability gets larger as k goes
from 4 to 1 and then to 0. The variability is also larger when the
range goes from (1,5) to (1,9). In both of these cases, the efﬁciency
of competitive full information game improves. Finally, as the dis-
tribution shifts to the left, the full information game also becomes
more efﬁcient.
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Fig. 3. Equilibrium (expected) contribution as a function of adjusted demand rate for two ﬁrms under asymmetric (full) information (a = 1,b = 5).
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Fig. 4. Equilibrium (expected) contribution as a function of adjusted demand rate for three ﬁrms under asymmetric (full) information (a = 1,b = 5).
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and ensures that ﬁrms contribute to joint replenishment, it also
leads to ﬁrms with higher adjusted demand rates contribute less
(see Figs. 3 and 4). The net effect is that aggregate contributions
in the asymmetric information game are smaller than aggregate
contributions in the full information game. Consequently, aggre-
gate total costs are always larger in the asymmetric informationgame. The aggregate total costs, on the average, are 5.71%,
14.05%, and 22.18% higher than centralized ordering for n = 2, 3,
and 4, respectively. The performance of the asymmetric informa-
tion game is quite insensitive to demand distribution. However,
the effects of uncertainty and skewness can still be observed and
are same as what we see in the full information game. As variabil-
ity goes up and the distribution shifts to the left, the efﬁciency of
Table 1
Performance comparisons.
n a b k m l r2 E½Cc  DCd DCf DCa DCaf
2 1 5 0 – 3.00 1.33 10.847 39.92 3.32 5.63 2.24
1 2 2.67 0.97 10.237 40.14 3.41 5.71 2.23
1 3 3.00 1.00 10.875 40.32 3.58 5.74 2.09
1 4 3.33 0.97 11.480 40.51 3.80 5.79 1.91
4 2 2.33 0.51 9.604 40.60 3.78 5.85 1.99
4 3 3.00 0.57 10.910 40.81 4.07 5.90 1.76
4 4 3.67 0.51 12.081 41.04 4.46 5.96 1.44
1 9 0 – 5.00 5.33 13.935 39.07 2.97 5.33 2.30
1 3 4.33 3.89 12.985 39.36 3.00 5.45 2.38
1 5 5.00 4.00 13.990 39.72 3.25 5.53 2.21
1 7 5.67 3.89 14.931 40.07 3.53 5.62 2.02
4 3 3.67 2.03 11.994 40.03 3.35 5.67 2.25
4 5 5.00 2.29 14.058 40.51 3.77 5.79 1.95
4 7 6.33 2.03 15.863 40.90 4.26 5.90 1.58
Average ? 40.22 3.61 5.71 2.02
3 1 5 0 – 3.00 1.33 13.330 70.78 8.67 13.73 4.66
1 2 2.67 0.97 12.576 71.12 8.80 14.04 4.81
1 3 3.00 1.00 13.352 71.42 9.34 14.15 4.40
1 4 3.33 0.97 14.087 71.74 9.97 14.32 3.95
4 2 2.33 0.51 11.786 71.85 9.72 14.56 4.41
4 3 3.00 0.57 13.380 72.22 10.56 14.74 3.79
4 4 3.67 0.51 14.808 72.59 11.62 14.99 3.03
1 9 0 – 5.00 5.33 17.157 69.46 7.78 12.80 4.66
1 3 4.33 3.89 15.981 69.87 7.78 13.16 4.99
1 5 5.00 4.00 17.199 70.47 8.49 13.43 4.55
1 7 5.67 3.89 18.339 71.05 9.27 13.76 4.10
4 3 3.67 2.03 14.737 70.93 8.62 13.90 4.86
4 5 5.00 2.29 17.252 71.73 9.82 14.35 4.12
4 7 6.33 2.03 19.451 72.36 11.12 14.78 3.29
Average ? 71.26 9.40 14.05 4.26
4 1 5 0 – 3.00 1.33 15.418 96.87 14.44 21.49 6.17
1 2 2.67 0.97 14.544 97.30 14.50 22.05 6.59
1 3 3.00 1.00 15.437 97.69 15.46 22.30 5.93
1 4 3.33 0.97 16.283 98.11 16.54 22.66 5.25
4 2 2.33 0.51 13.622 98.24 15.87 23.07 6.21
4 3 3.00 0.57 15.461 98.72 17.32 23.46 5.24
4 4 3.67 0.51 17.106 99.21 19.08 23.98 4.12
1 9 0 – 5.00 5.33 19.860 95.18 13.05 19.96 6.11
1 3 4.33 3.89 18.496 95.69 12.91 20.52 6.74
1 5 5.00 4.00 19.896 96.49 14.14 21.09 6.10
1 7 5.67 3.89 21.206 97.24 15.45 21.72 5.43
4 3 3.67 2.03 17.045 97.05 14.15 21.83 6.73
4 5 5.00 2.29 19.941 98.10 16.17 22.73 5.65
4 7 6.33 2.03 22.472 98.91 18.32 23.59 4.45
Average ? 97.49 15.53 22.18 5.77
E. Körpeog˘lu et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 227 (2013) 434–443 441the asymmetric information game gets better. However, in com-
parison to the full information game, the gap is smaller when the
variability is smaller and the distribution is right-skewed. Also
the performance of asymmetric information compared to full
information gets worse as the number of ﬁrms increase. This hap-
pens because total contributions decrease more for the asymmetric
information game as more retailers participate in joint replenish-
ment (See Figs. 3 and 4).
We should note that the gaps reported here between the cen-
tralized ordering and the asymmetric information game may be
considered signiﬁcant in practice. One may ﬁnd it attractive to cen-
tralize the joint replenishment decision and allocate the efﬁcient
costs to the ﬁrms, especially given that stable allocations can be
computed easily, at least in practice (Dror et al., 2012). However,
any such cooperative solution requires information on all adjusted
demand rates, which the ﬁrms may not want to disclose to the
intermediary or each other for various reasons.4. Conclusion
In this paper, we consider a joint replenishment problem in
which n ex-ante identical ﬁrms submits their contributions to anintermediary which sets a joint cycle time that would ﬁnance the
ﬁxed cost of replenishment. The demand rates and inventory hold-
ing cost rates are ﬁrms’ private information. We show that an equi-
librium for this asymmetric information game exists and
characterize the equilibrium. We show that while information
asymmetry eliminates free-riding in the contributions game, it also
leads to contributing less for those ﬁrms who have higher demand
rates and/or inventory holding cost rates. The net effect of informa-
tion asymmetry is lower aggregate contributions and higher aggre-
gate costs for the system.
One can consider a number of extensions to better capture the
details of more realistic settings. First, one can consider more com-
plex mechanisms that govern participation in joint replenishment.
For example, one can investigate alternative mechanisms in which
ﬁrms contribute sequentially rather than simultaneously or ﬁrms’
contributions are stated as a function of joint cycle time. Second,
one can better model the joint replenishment environment. For
example, the replenishment cost (a ﬁxed cost in our setting) may
be a function of the volume or may involve minor costs. Finally,
one may consider settings in which the a retailer may be facing
uncertain and non-stationary demand.Appendix A
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the best response function for ﬁrm j at aj and aj +  for
a given  > 0. First assume that aj > a^ðajÞ and the best responses
at aj and aj +  are interior solutions to problem in (4). In this case,
ﬁrm j’s best responses can be found by the following two
equations:Z
An1
f n1ðajÞ
qðrj;ajÞ þ
P
k2N;k–jrkðakÞ
 2 daj ¼ 2jaj ; ð16Þ
Z
An1
f n1ðajÞ
qðrj;aj þ Þ þ
P
k2N;k–jrkðakÞ
 2 daj ¼ 2jðaj þ Þ : ð17Þ
Taking the difference between (16) and (17) and rearranging,
we getZ
An1
ðqðrj;aj þ Þ þqðrj;ajÞ þ 2
P
k2N;k–jrkðakÞÞf n1ðajÞ
qðrj;aj þ Þ þ
P
k2N;k–jrkðakÞ
 2
qðrj;ajÞ þ
P
k2N;k–jrkðakÞ
 2 daj
¼ 2
jajðaj þ Þðqðrj;aj þ Þ qðrj;ajÞÞ : ð18Þ
The integrand in the left hand side of (18) is strictly positive. There-
fore, the deﬁnite integral should also be positive, leading to
q(rj,aj + ) > q(rj,aj).
On the other hand, if aj 6 a^ðajÞ and ﬁrm j’s best response is to
contribute zero at aj, then the ﬁrm will contribute either zero or a
positive amount at aj + . hA.2. Proof of Theorem 1
In order to prove the existence we invoke the following propo-
sition by Meirowitz (2003):
Proposition 1. A Bayesian game has a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash
equilibrium if for each j 2 N
1. A and H are nonempty, convex and compact subsets of Euclid-
ean space.
2. uj(r,a) = /j(r,a) is continuous.
3. For every a and measurable function fn1(aj)
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An1
ujðrj; rj;aj;ajÞf n1ðajÞdaj ¼ Ujðrj; rj;ajÞis strictly quasi-concave in rj.
4. For every ej > 0 there exists some constant mj such that for any
given rj thensup
ðaj ;a0jÞ2A:jaja0j j<mj
n ojqðrj;ajÞ  qðrj;a0jÞj < ej:5. fn1(aj) is continuous.
Now, A and H are both closed, bounded and consist of single
intervals by assumption. Thus, they are nonempty, convex and
compact. Thus, condition 1 is satisﬁed. Since the function / given
in Eq. (2) is continuous, condition 2 is also satisﬁed. Similarly,
the belief function fn1(aj) is continuous since it is the multiplica-
tion of continuous probability density functions f(a) by assumption
so condition 5 is satisﬁed. Since the derivative of U provided in (6)
is strictly positive, U is convex. Therefore condition 3 is also
satisﬁed.
The only remaining condition is condition 4, which states that
the slope of the best response function is uniformly bounded. In
order to prove the assertion, we take two different types aj and
a0j for ﬁrm j. First, assume that the best responses at aj and a0j both
satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions (i.e., they are different from
zero).
2
jaj
 2
ja0j
¼
Z
An1
1
qðrj;ajÞ þ
P
i–jriðaiÞ
 2 f n1ðajÞdaj

Z
An1
1
qðrj;a0jÞ þ
P
i–jriðaiÞ
 2 f n1ðajÞdaj
¼
Z
An1
1
qðrj;ajÞ þ
P
i–jriðaiÞ
 2  1
qðrj;a0jÞ þ
P
i–jriðaiÞ
 2 f n1ðajÞ
0
B@
1
CAdaj
¼
Z
An1
qðrj;a0jÞ þ
P
i–jriðaiÞ
 2
 ðqðrj;ajÞ þ
X
i–j
riðaiÞÞ2
qðrj;ajÞ þ
P
i–jriðaiÞ
 2
qðrj;a0jÞ þ
P
i–jriðaiÞ
 2 f n1ðajÞdaj
¼ q rj;a0j
 
qðrj;ajÞ
 

Z
An1
qðrj;ajÞ þqðrj;a0jÞ þ2
P
i–jriðaiÞ
qðrj;ajÞ þ
P
i–jriðaiÞ
 2
qðrj;a0jÞ þ
P
i–jriðaiÞ
 2 f n1ðajÞdaj
¼ qrj;a0jqðrj;ajÞ 

Z
An1
1
qðrj;ajÞ þ
P
i–jriðaiÞ
 
q rj;a0j
 
þPi–jriðaiÞ 2
f n1ðajÞaj
0
B@
þ
Z
An1
1
qðrj;ajÞ þ
P
i–jriðaiÞ
 2
qðrj;a0jÞ þ
P
i–jriðaiÞ
  f n1ðajÞdaj
1
CA:
Using the ﬁrst order conditions and rjðajÞ 6 r for all j 2 N, we can
writeZ
An1
1
ðqðrj;ajÞ þ
X
i–j
riðaiÞÞ2ðqðrj;aj0Þ þ
X
i–j
riðaiÞÞ
f n1ðajÞdaj
P
Z
An1
1
nrðqðrj;ajÞ þ
X
i–j
riðaiÞÞ2
f n1ðajÞaj ¼ 2nrjaj :
A similar result can be obtained for a0j. Taking the absolute values on
both sides, we have
2
jaj
 2
ja0j

P qrj;a0jÞ  qðrj;ajÞ
  2
nrjaj
þ 2
nrja0j
 !
:
Rearranging the terms and using ajP a > 0 and a0j P a > 0, we
obtain:a0j  aj
 P qðrj;a0jÞ  qðrj;ajÞ  a0j þ ajnr
 
P rj a
0
j
 
 rj ðajÞ
 ð2a=nrÞ:
Now, assume that ej > 0 and let mj ¼ eð2a=nrÞ. Then ja0j  ajj < mj im-
plies jqðrj;a0jÞ  qðrj;ajÞjð2a=nrÞ < mj or rj ða0jÞ  rj ðajÞ
  < ej.
The fact that the best response function has a uniformly
bounded slope can also be shown more easily if we have q(rj,
aj) = 0 and/or qðrj;a0jÞ ¼ 0. h
A.3. Proof of Lemma 2
Assume that for all k– j, there exists Bk  A such that Bk– ; and
rkðakÞ ¼ 0 for ak 2 Bk. Let B ¼
Q
k–jBk . Given its type and other
ﬁrms’ equilibrium contributions, ﬁrm j’s best response is to select
a contribution rjP 0 that minimizes
Uj rj; rj;aj
 
¼ 1
2
jaj
Z
B
1
rj
f n1ðajÞdaj þ 12 jaj
Z
An1nB
 1
rj þ
P
k2N;k–jr

kðakÞ
f n1ðajÞdaj þ rj:
Clearly, ﬁrm j’s best response is to select rj that is strictly positive for
any given aj. This leads to an equilibrium contribution function that
satisﬁes rj ðajÞ > 0 for all aj. h
A.4. Proof of Theorem 2
Let j be the ﬁrm which satisﬁes r⁄(aj) > 0 for all aj 2 A. Note that
rj ðajÞ is ﬁrm j’s best response to other ﬁrms’ equilibrium contribu-
tions. Since rj ðajÞ > 0 for all aj, we have the following from (7)Z
An1
1
ðr1ða1Þ þ r2ða2Þ þ    þ rnðanÞÞ2
f n1ðajÞdaj
¼ 2
jaj
for all aj: ð19Þ
Multiplying both sides of Eq. (19) by f(aj) and integrating over A we
getZ
An
1
r1ða1Þ þ r2ða2Þ þ    þ rnðanÞ
 2 f nðaÞda ¼ E 2jaj
	 

: ð20Þ
Now consider another ﬁrm k such thatZ
An1
1
r1ða1Þ þ r2ða2Þ þ    þ rnðanÞ
 2 f n1ðakÞdak þ fkðakÞ ¼ 2jak
ð21Þ
where fk(ak) is zero when rkðakÞ > 0 and fk(ak) is possibly a positive
quantity when rkðakÞ ¼ 0. Multiplying each term of Eq. (21) by f(ak)
and integrating over A, we getZ
An
1
r1ða1Þ þ r2ða2Þ þ    þ rnðanÞ
 2 f nðaÞdaþ E½fkðakÞ
¼ E 2
jak
	 

: ð22Þ
Using (20) and (22) we get
E½fkðakÞ ¼ E
2
jak
	 

 E 2
jaj
	 

: ð23Þ
Since aj and ak are identically distributed, the right hand side of (23)
is zero leading to E½fkðakÞ ¼ 0. Note however that fk(ak) can only
take on non-negative values. Therefore, we should have fk(ak) = 0
for all ak leading to Eq. (19) being valid not only for ﬁrm j but for
all other ﬁrms. h
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